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Abstract: Cochrane (2014) shows that high-powered money balances and short-term government
bonds can be considered as perfect substitutes for the U.S economy during the past twenty years.
We build on this claim and consider a variant of the standard cashless new-Keynesian model with
two types of government bonds, which can be thought of as short- and long-term bonds. The first one
has a macroeconomic role in the sense that it provides transaction services in addition to generating
a yield. The other type of government bond pays only an interest rate. Consistent with previous
findings, the Taylor principle is not a panacea for equilibrium determinacy in a model without money.
When the government bond market matters beyond the need for fiscal solvency, monetary policy
rules do not need to comply with the Taylor principle for unique equilibria to exist.
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1. Introduction
On 10 February 2010, Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke testified before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Financial Services with a statement titled “Federal Reserve’s exit
strategy”. His speech included the following remarks:
“Most importantly, in October 2008 the Congress gave the Federal Reserve statutory authority to
pay interest on banks’ holdings of reserve balances. By increasing the interest rate on reserves, the
Federal Reserve will be able to put significant upward pressure on all short-term interest rates, as
banks will not supply short-term funds to the money markets at rates significantly below what they
can earn by holding reserves at the Federal Reserve Banks.”
Interestingly, in Bernanke’s view, the experience from the payment of interest rates on banks’
reserves could provide useful guidance for amending the operational framework for the Fed
monetary policy:1
“The authority to pay interest on reserves is likely to be an important component of the future
operating framework for monetary policy. For example, one approach is for the Federal Reserve to
bracket its target for the federal funds rate with the discount rate above and the interest rate on
excess reserves below.”
1 Bowman et al. (2010) discuss the experience of other central banks characterized by policy regimes with interest rates on
excess reserves.
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This type of monetary policy action has gone hand in hand with large-scale asset purchases by the
Fed. On 1 December 2008, Bernanke (2008) announced publicly that the Fed “could purchase longer-term
Treasury securities (. . . ) in substantial quantities”. By 18 March 2009, the Fed held 300 billion USD of
long-term Treasury securities. Hence, a wide array of different policy tools have been put in place
since the outbreak of the financial crisis in the U.S. Based on the idea that macroeconomic recovery
runs through the ability of the Fed to steer financial markets towards a desired reaction path, many
commentators and policy analysts have dwelled on the short-term effects of the Fed decisions (e.g., see
Gagnon et al. 2010; Woodford 2012).
One of the consequences of the Fed actions is that high-powered money balances and short-term
government bonds have become perfect substitutes for banks. In other words, banks’ reserve balances
and short-term U.S. Treasuries pay a similar interest rate. In the experience of ultra-loose liquidity
supply by the FED, reserve requirements are far from binding. In terms of macroeconomic outlook,
Cochrane (2014) stresses that the U.S. inflation rate has been stable during the past decade, and that
there have been small variations in policy and short-term rates. But what are the implications of this
macroeconomic landscape for the ability of monetary policy to lead the economy towards a cyclical
path of stability? Does that ability that depend only on the decisions by the central bank in a world
where the government bond market plays a well-acknowledged role for achieving the objective of
macroeconomic stability? These policy-relevant questions are the focus of our paper.
The point of departure of our analysis concerns the interpretation of two facts that have not
been fully discussed in the literature yet, and that are centred around the role of government bonds.
In a world where short-term bonds can be considered as perfect substitutes for high-powered money,
it becomes clear that short-term bonds have an economic property that long-term bonds do not have.
This means that the economic differences between short- and long-term bonds are not only about the
maturity structure, i.e., about exogenous characteristics.2
The second key to understanding the implications of the perfect substitutability between banks’
reserves and short-term government securities arises from the role of money as a medium of exchange
in the provision of ‘transaction services’ that ‘facilitate’ purchases in consumption goods markets.3
In particular, if money and short-term bonds are perfect substitutes, then these bonds can be expected
to deliver transaction services in a broad economic sense.
Obviously this discussion is not meant to imply that anyone can go to the grocery and buy, say,
apples by posting bonds as a payment instrument or as a guarantee. Inasmuch as economic agents are
satiated with cash in modern economies, the macroeconomic role of government bonds is pervasive in
enabling the capability of financial markets to finance every day’s economic activities. They are used
to perform functions that indirectly facilitate transactions in the real markets, and that contribute to
the smooth functioning of final-goods markets. For instance, Aggarwal et al. (2017) suggests that the
European government bond lending market allows borrowers to access safe assets and, as such, is an
integral part of the short-term funding market.
Our modelling approach for riskless assets as a function of transaction costs has already been
considered in the literature. For instance, Vayanos and Vila (1999) study a continuous-time economy
with overlapping generations of agents with two assets. One of these carries a transaction cost,
while the other is ‘liquid’ in a microeconomic sense. Vayanos and Vila (1999) show that, in equilibrium,
the price difference depends on the relative asset supply.
2 This line of reasoning has already been proposed in other strands of literature. For instance, Vayanos and Vila (2009)
suggests that there is a class of investors that has preferences over bond maturities, and that interact with arbitrageurs to
determine market prices. This interpretation implies that changes to the maturity structure prevailing in the market unveil
investor preferences.
3 Unsurprisingly, this idea is reflected by the transaction-cost approach for modelling non-zero money demand in equilibrium
(e.g., see Feenstra 1986).
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Based on these considerations, we study the ability of a central bank to pin down determine
macroeconomic equilibria in a standard New Keynesian model with two types of bonds.4 The first
type provides transaction services that are accounted for in the purchase of consumption goods. It pays
the policy rate as a yield. The other bond performs the usual function of store of value, and pays
an exogenous spread on the policy rate. We can think of the bond-market segment with frictions
as representing short-term bonds. The rest of the bond market can be thought of as a longer-term
segment. The financial market friction generates a non-trivial form of the aggregate demand curve,
which depends on the spread between the rates on the bond with frictions and the frictionless bond.
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. Government taxes are non-distortionary and evolve according
to a simple feedback rule.
Given the macroeconomic role of government bonds, the fiscal theory of the price level
determination of Leeper (1991) holds.5 Hence, our discussion touches upon the large field of
study on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in a world where nominal rigidities
bind.6 Consistently with Cochrane (2014) and Woodford (1995) among others, we assume that
agents are satiated with liquidity, and abstract from the role of money in business cycles. For this
reason, our analysis can be read as an investigation into the results of Canzoneri and Diba (2005),
Canzoneri et al. (2008) and Canzoneri et al. (2011). They study equilibrium determinacy in a New
Keynesian setting where money balances and government bonds are imperfect substitutes. Both
assets contribute to an aggregate measure of transaction services that allows to finance the purchase
of consumption goods. This implies that there is a direct channel for government bonds to affect the
inflation rate, along with money balances. Hence, the Taylor principle need not hold any longer for
determinate equilibria to exist.
We show that a segmented bond market with transaction services delivers non-trivial implications
for equilibrium determinacy also in a cashless economy. Simple rules for monetary policy do not
necessarily require that the inflation coefficient should be larger than one in order to generate unique
macroeconomic equilibria. In other words, the Taylor principle is not sacrosant any longer, even
when changes in monetary aggregates do not matter. For instance, when the policy rate responds to
inflation in a persistent way, a weak response of the central bank to inflation on one hand, and a weak
response of the tax rate to government liabilities on the other are sufficient to pin down the inflation
rate. These findings are consistent with the results of Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and their subsequent
papers based on monetary economies.
This paper is organized as follows. In the Section 1 we introduce the model forming the basis of
the theoretical results. In Section 2 we discuss the equilibrium characteristics of the model with explicit
reference to the existence of a deflationary/inflationary equilibrium path. Section 3 reports the main
theoretical results of the model together with some simulations. Section 4 presents some concluding
remarks. An additional Appendix includes a detailed discussion of the model structure, and a full set
of proofs of the analytical results discussed in the main text.
2. A Model with Bond Transaction Costs
We assume that there is a representative consumer that maximizes the following utility function
Ut =
∞
∑
t=0
βt
C
γ(1− 1σ )
t (1− Lt)(1−γ)(1−
1
σ )(
1− 1σ
) (1)
4 For a thorough treatment of the New Keynesian model, the reader may refer to the seminal textbook by Woodford (2003).
5 In the terminology of Woodford (2001), fiscal policy may be described as ‘non-Ricardian’.
6 See Leeper and Leith (2016) for a well-organized summary of literature.
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where Ct indicates the amount of consumption, and Lt the amount of labour effort supplied. In (1) β
indicates the discount factor, while σ (0 < σ < ∞) denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity,
the inverse of which is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
We consider a cashless economy where the consumer can hold a portfolio of two types of
government bonds, B∗t and Bt. Bonds B∗t perform the standard function of intertemporal store of value.
This type of security pays an interest rate i∗t−1. Bonds Bt, instead, provide direct transaction services in
place. This is accounted for by the transaction cost function f (Ft), where Ft plays the role of ‘velocity
of circulation of bonds’:
Ft =
PtCt
Bt
(2)
In addition to the interest rates obtained from investment in bonds (it−1Bt−1 and i∗t−1B
∗
t−1),
the consumer derives funds from supplying labour in quantity Lt, paid at the wage rate Wt. An
additional source of income is given by the participation to the profit Ωjt of a firm producing the
final-good variety j. A lump sum tax denoted by Tt is imposed by the government.7 The consumer’s
budget constraint takes the form:
Bt + B∗t =
(
1+ i∗t−1
)
B∗t−1 + (1+ it−1) Bt−1 +WtLt + PtΩ
j
t − PtCt (1+ χg (Ft))− Tt (3)
We assume that the bond-velocity function g (Ft) has the following properties:
g (Ft) = 0 for Ft ≤ 0 (4)
g′ (Ft) > 0 and g′′ (Ft) ≥ 0 (5)
Assumption (4) tells us that negative bond holdings do not provide any transaction services.
Assumption (5), instead, formalizes the idea that the transaction cost function is increasing and convex
in Ft. The convexity of g (Ft) is needed in order to make sure that the utility maximization program
delivers a true maximum. If the budget constraint was not convex, we would need to explore if there
is - at least locally - the possibility of showing that the first order conditions deliver a true maximum.
Overall, the term χg (Ft) identifies the transaction costs in terms of consumption spending, with a
constant scale parameter χ.
The first order conditions with respect to Ct, Lt, Bt and B∗t are, respectively,
γC
γ(1− 1σ )−1
t (1− Lt)(1−γ)(1−
1
σ ) = Ptλt
[
1+ χg (Ft) + χg′ (Ft) Ft
]
(6)
(1− γ)Cγ(1−
1
σ )
t (1− Lt)(1−γ)(1−
1
σ )−1 = λtWt (7)
βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
(1+ i∗t ) =
λt
Pt
(8)
βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
(1+ it) =
λt
Pt
[
1− χg′ (Ft) F2t
]
(9)
In (6)–(9) λt indicates the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint (3). Equation (6) defines the
intertemporal choice of consumption, where the effects of first order due to the transaction technology
appear a critical element in the definition of intertemporal trade-offs. Equation (7) defines the optimal
labour supply choice and equates the disutility from work effort to the real wage weighted by the
marginal utility of consumption. Equation (8) indicates the optimal allocation of bonds B∗t−1, while
Equation (9) represents the optimal allocation of bonds Bt. In particular, from Equation (9) we observe
7 Since our aim is to consider the most basic form of the New Keynesian model, we abstract from the role of real capital and
investment in this paper.
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that the presence of transaction costs creates a wedge in the Euler equation between the left and the
right-hand side.
We make the assumption that the transaction cost function g (Ft) is given by
g (Ft) =
F2t
2
(10)
Function (10) fulfils all the requirements stated in (4) and (5) and allows a tractable derivation of
the equilibrium conditions. Therefore, using (10) into (6) and (9) and rearranging terms, we can derive
the demand for short term bonds
bt =
[
χ
(1+ it)
i∗t − it
]1/3
Ct (11)
where bt = Bt/Pt. We can see that the short-term bond demand (11) is increasing with respect to it
and Ct, and (ii) decreasing with respect to i∗t . In fact, if the return on un-starred bonds increases, they
become more attractive with respect to starred bonds. If consumption increases, then the demand for
short term bonds increases, because of the need to finance more transactions. Finally, if the return i∗t on
competing assets increases, the demand for Bt falls.8 The relation of imperfect substitutability between
the two types of bonds is already reflected by the transaction role attached to short-term bonds.
For simplicity, we assume that the relationship between the interest rates on short- and long-term
bonds takes the form:
i∗t = ζtit (12)
where ζt is a term that determines the comovements between i∗t and it. This follows a first-order
autoregressive process with an exogenous shock εζt:
log ζt =
(
1− ρζ
)
ζ + ρζ log ζt−1 + εζt (13)
The rest of the model follows the standard new-Keynesian tradition. To complete the demand
side of the economy, we assume that there is a large number of differentiated goods indexed over the
real line between 0 and 1. This allows each firm to have a control of the price of her final good to be
sold, since output becomes demand determined. Following the approach by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
we assume that the consumption bundle Ct demanded by the consumer is a CES type aggregate of all
the j ∈ [0, 1] varieties of final goods produced in this economy
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
ct (j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
(14)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods produced by each firm j.
On the supply side, the source of nominal rigidities consist in sticky prices modelled via the menu
costs approach of Rotemberg (1982). A firm pays a cost in terms of output Yt each time the price level
of her final goods differs from steady state inflation rate pi. We assume that price adjustments take
place subject to the function according to
ACpt =
φp
2
[
Pt (j)
Pt−1 (j)
− pi
]2
Yt (15)
where pi is the steady-state inflation rate. The production function of the firm for each variety j is given by
Yt (j) = AtLαt (j) (16)
8 These properties make the behaviour of Equation (11) quite close to those of a traditional money demand function.
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All firms producing j varieties are subject to an homogenous technological shock At, which follows
the standard autoregressive process of order one. This problem structure implies that each firm faces a
downward demand curve, and chooses the optimal quantity of labour input Lt (j) by maximizing the
expected stream of real profits subject to the demand function, the production function (16) and the
price adjustment cost function (15).
The government budget constraint is
Bt + B∗t = (1+ it−1) Bt−1 +
(
1+ i∗t−1
)
B∗t−1 + Gt − Tt (17)
In (17) the primary deficit (surplus) Gt − Tt plus interest rate proceedings paid by the government
to the owner of government debt (both short and long debt) it−1Bt−1, i∗t−1B
∗
t−1 are financed by issuing
new debt: Bt − Bt−1, B∗t − B∗t−1.
Following the prescription of the fiscal theory of price level determination, the comparative
evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules has to be coupled with a fiscal policy rule setting the
level of taxes in reaction to the outstanding path of real debt. Therefore, a ‘tax backing’ of public debt
is needed in order to prevent the increase of the prices. We assume that this is implemented according
to the simple fiscal policy rule
Tt = ψ0 + ψ1
B∗t−1
Pt
+ ψ2
Bt−1
Pt
(18)
According to (18), the level of fiscal revenues is set to react to the outstanding level of real debt.
Our final assumption concerns the evolution of public expenditure Gt, for which we assume the
following AR(1) process
log Gt = (1− ρG)G + ρG log Gt−1 + εGt (19)
where εGt is an i.i.d. random variable distributed normally, with zero mean and variance given by σ2g .
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets the policy rate according to variants
of the well-celebrated rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and largely used in the literature (e.g., see
Clarida et al. 2000).:
it = i
(pit
pi
)φpi (yt
y
)φy ( it−1
i
)φi
(20)
with φpi , φy, and φi as positive reaction coefficients.
Qualitative Model Properties
In order to provide intuition on our variant of the New Keynesian model, we discuss the impulse
responses of the model to the term spread shocks εζt.9 For that purpose, we calibrate the model on
quarterly U.S. data over the sample 1959:1-2007:4. The values of the non-policy parameters are reported
in Table 1. The nominal interest rate has been set equal to 1.6 per cent per quarter, as recovered from
sample observations. In order to simplify algebra, the long run inflation rate (in gross terms) has been
set equal to 1. The share of consumption in GDP at the steady state is assumed to be 0.57. The value of
χ has been set to match a level of transaction costs equal to 2 per cent per year. The parameter φ0 in
the fiscal policy reaction function has been set to match the steady state ratio of debt to GDP equal to
0.44. For the analysis of this section, we fix the parameters of the Taylor rule to φpi = 1.5, φy = 0.5 and
φi = 0.7.10 We also assume that the fiscal policy rule depends on ψ0 = 0.1 and ψ1 = ψ2 = 0.05. Finally,
we set the autocorrelation ρζ of the term spread shock to 0.98.11
9 The model features also alternative sources of exogenous shocks to productivity and government spending. We do not discuss
the impulse responses from these shocks because our model delivers macroeconomic patterns that are fairly consistent with
the literature. On the other hand, a term-structure shock is not often accounted for in available microfounded models.
10 In the following sections, we make alternative assumptions for the monetary policy rule, which we discuss in greater detail.
11 An anonymous referee has suggested that the policy changes that have taken place since the beginning of the so-called ‘Great
Recession’ in the U.S. could be characterized as time variation in the parameters of the Taylor rule. A similar argument might
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Table 1. Calbration of non-policy parameters.
β χ γ θ σ ψ0 ψ1 α
0.997 0.22 0.76 10 0.1 8.31 0.05 0.77
Figure 1 reports the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of the term spread shock εζt
in percentage points. This implies that the long-term interest rate increases by more than the policy
rate. Since the supply of nominal bonds is fixed, the inflation rate must increase for the real bond
holdings to fall, and for markets to clear. The positive response of the two interest rates on impact
generates proceeds on the pre-existing stock of debt. This allows households to increase consumption
while working less. The negative response of output depends on the interaction between two forces of
opposite sign. The rise in consumption and the drop of the holdings of short-term real debt produces
an increase in transaction costs, which drives output above steady state. However, the impact of the
drop in labour supply prevails.
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Figure 1. Impulse responses to a term-spread shock.
3. Determinacy of Rational Expectations Equilibria
In this section we study the stability of a system with three equations for p˜it, y˜t and b˜t. One of
these equations is related to the policy rate, which is set according to alternative formulations of the
general reaction function (20).12
be proposed with reference to the fiscal-policy rule. We believe that the issue of parameter instability and structural change
in policy formation can provide a relevant perspective on the driving forces behind the determination of macroeconomic
equilibria. However, we would like to leave this discussion for another contribution. In this contribution, we intend to make
a more general point that concerns that assumptions about the macroeconomic role of government bonds.
12 For the remainder of the paper, all variables are expressed as log-linear deviations from the steady state in the remainder of
the paper.
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3.1. Taylor Rule
Let us assume that monetary policy follows the standard rule
i˜t = φpip˜it + φyy˜t (21)
This formulation implies that the nominal interest rate reacts contemporaneously with respect to
current inflation and output gap. Using Equation (21), we can obtain a closed-form three-equation
system in p˜it, y˜t, b˜t represented in matrix form as13
AZt+1 = BZt (22)
or, after multiplying matrix B by A−1,
Zt+1 = ΓZt (23)
With the monetary policy rule (21), the matrix Γ is defined according to
Γ =
[
Γ2×211 Γ
2×1
12
Γ1×221 Γ
1×1
22
]
(24)
=
 β−1 (1+ µiφpi) β
(
µiφy − µy
)
0
α21 α22 0
α31 α32 β
−1 − ψ1
 (25)
where α21 =
(λpi − λiφpi)(1 + µiφpi)
β(1 + λiφy)
+ γiφpi1 + λiφy , α22 =
(λpi−λiφpi)(µiφy − µy) + β(1 + γiφpi)
β(1 + λiφy)
, b31 =
(γy + γiφy)(λiφpi − λpi)
β(1 + λiφy)
− (γpi + γiφpi)β , b32 =
γy + γiφy
1 + λiφy
, α31 = b31 (1 + µiφpi) + b32γiφpi + θiφpi, α32 =
b31
(
µiφy − µy
)
+ b32 (1+ γiφpi) + θy + θiφy.
Proposition 1. Given φpi ≥ 0, φy ≥ 0. For a model with contemporaneous inflation and output targeting
interest rules, necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique rational expectations equilibrium are: (i) either
φpi < φpi , φy > φy and β
−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (26)
(ii) or
φpi > φpi or φy < φy and ψ1 < β
−1 − 1; ψ1 > β−1 + 1 (27)
where
φ
pi
=
µy (1+ λpi)− 2 (1+ β)− φy (λi + λpiµi + γi (1+ β))
2µi + λiµy
(28)
φy =
φpiλiµi + β− 1+ µy (1− λpi)
γi − λi − λpiµi − βγi (29)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Even in this case we obtain the results presented for pure inflation targeting. From condition (26)
we see that a combination of active monetary policy with passive fiscal policy delivers a determinate
equilibrium. Since matrix Γ is once again lower triangular to guarantee a determinate equilibrium
we need to have two roots outside the unit circle. Because of the format of matrix Γ, the requirement
13 Appendix E shows that the system is obtained by inserting (21) into (A23) and (A24) and rearranging. The terms R˜nt and R˜2t
do not appear in the reduced-form system because they do not affect the system dynamics.
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of active monetary policy can be violated, but the equilibrium is still determinate if fiscal policy is
properly set to keep the price level determinate.
To investigate the nature of the bounds described in the proposition above, we compute numerical
model solutions for intervals of φpi and φy described in (28)–(29). We calibrate the model parameters
to the values outlined earlier. Figure 2 reports the numerical bounds for the region of determinate
equilibria. The continuous line refers to the bound (29) for φy as function of φpi , and the dotted line
represents the evolution of φpi (28) as function of φy. Each parameter varies over a range of values
largely accepted by current empirical evidence lying between 0 and 10. The direction of various
arrows follows the inequalities (28)–(29). The graph in Figure 2 indicates that determinacy can be
obtained in a wide range of parameter, but there is an upper bound for inflation targeting coefficient
φpi , and a lower bound for φy. In the model considered here there is an upper bound for the inflation
targeting coefficient. It is not difficult to realize that this is almost entirely due to the presence of
liquidity services modelled in a non-trivial way. Fiscal policy parameters have the role to pin down
determinacy conditions even when bounds (28)–(29) are not respected. When, instead the conditions
are given by (27), the regions with determinacy/indeterminacy is reversed, with respect to what has
been represented in Figure 2. In this case, monetary policy need not be active, provided that fiscal
policy evolves according to (27).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Current inflation, current output
φ
pi
φ x
DETERMINACY
Figure 2. Determinacy regions for a Taylor rule with current inflation and current output.
3.2. Pure Current-Inflation Targeting
In this section, we assume that monetary policy follows the simple rule
i˜t = φpip˜it (30)
The first-difference system is defined by the matrices
Zt =
 p˜ity˜t
b˜∗t
 ; A =
 β 0 0λiφpi − λpi 1 0
a1 γy 1
 ; B =
 1+ µiφpi −µy 0γiφpi 1 0
b3 b2 β−1 − ψ1

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with a1 ≡ γiφpi + γpi ; b2 ≡ γiφy + γy; b3 ≡ θiφy + θy, and
Γ =
 β−1 (1+ µiφpi) −βµy 0γ21 γ22 0
γ31 γ32 β
−1 − ψ1
 (31)
where the terms γ21, γ22,γ31, γ32 in (31) are defined as follows
γ21 = β
−1 (1+ µiφpi) (λpi − λiφpi) + γiφpi
γ22 = 1− β−1 (λpi − λiφpi)
γ31 =
[
γy (λiφpi − λpi)− γi
]
(1+ µiφpi) + b3 − a1γiφpi
From (31), we observe that the structure of the system is block-triangular. Therefore, to study
determinacy we can restrict our attention to the 2× 2 submatrix ∆ given by
∆ =
[
β−1 (1+ µiφpi) −βµy
γ21 γ22
]
(32)
To achieve a fully-determinate system, two eigenvalues should be outside the unit circle and one
inside, since public debt is a predetermined variable. This allows a richer configuration of determinacy
conditions rather than in cases without an explicit role for the government budget constraint.
Proposition 2. Let φpi ≥ 0. Under contemporaneous pure inflation targeting rule, necessary and sufficient
conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be determinate are:
(a) either
φpi > φpi1 and β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (33)
(b) or
φpi < φpi1 and ψ1 < β−1 − 1; ψ1 > β−1 + 1 (34)
where φpi1 =
µyλpi−2(1+β)
[2µi+µy(γi+λi)]
.
Proof. See Appendix F.
According to the terminology of Leeper (1991), condition (33) identifies a combination of active
monetary and passive fiscal policy, while condition (34) identifies a combination of passive monetary
and active fiscal. In the sense of Leeper (1991), an active monetary policy is defined when monetary
authority sets nominal interest rate (or money supply) in order to keep under control the inflation
rate. A passive monetary policy is when, instead, the interest rate (or money supply) are left free to
adjust. In the recent monetary policy literature, condition (34) is identified with a combination of active
fiscal policy and passive monetary policy. In particular, if φpi > φpi1 and ψ1 < β−1 − 1, ψ1 > β−1 + 1,
we have three roots inside the unit circle. In this case, we have three converging roots and a continuum
of solution. In this case the price level is converging, but indeterminate. A combination of passive
fiscal policy with passive monetary policy determines an indeterminacy of order 1. As condition (34)
shows, determinacy can be also reached if the burden of price stability is entirely on behalf of fiscal
policy authority. Hence, monetary policy can be also set independently from the inflation rate and
determinacy is ensured by fiscal policy.
3.3. Expected Inflation Targeting
Now we consider a generalization of expected inflation targeting
i˜t = φpiEtp˜it+1 (35)
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 23 11 of 27
The resulting system of first-order difference equations with the form (22) depends on the matrices14
A =
 1 0 0a21 a22 0
a31 a32 1
 ; B =
 b11 −µyb11 00 1 0
0 θy
(
β−1 − ψ1
)

where a21 =
λiφpi − λpi(β − µiφpi) − γiφpi(β − µiφpi)
(β − µiφpi) ; a22 =
β − φpi(µi + λiµy)
(β − µiφpi) ; a31 = γpi +
γiφpi
β − µiφpi − θiφpi ;
a32 = γy − γiφpiµyβ−µiφpi ; b11 = (β − µiφpi)
−1. The structure of matrix Γ is given by
Γ =
[
Γ2×211 Γ
2×1
12
Γ1×221 Γ
1×1
22
]
=
=
 b11 −µyb11 0− a21b11a22 µyb11a21+1a22 0
c31b11 c32 − c31µyb11 + θy β−1 − ψ1
 (36)
where c31 = (a21a32 − a22a31) /β; c32 = −β−1a32. From (36) we observe that the structure of the system
is block-triangular. The conditions for determinacy are collected in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given φpi ≥ 0. For a model with expected inflation targeting interest rules, necessary and
sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to be determinate are:
(i) either
φpi1 < φpi < φpi2 and β
−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (37)
(ii) or
φpi1 < φpi < φpi2 and ψ1 < β
−1 − 1; ψ1 > β−1 + 1 (38)
Proof. See Appendix G.
Proposition 3 suggests that it is possible to reach determinacy conditions without satisfying the
Taylor principle. This is possible because of a non-trivial specification of the AS and IS curve, due to
the different way by which liquidity services are modelled in this context.
3.4. Backward Inflation Targeting
Another variant of the Taylor rule is based on the idea of backward-looking inflation targeting
i˜t = φpip˜it−1 (39)
Our results are collected in the following proposition
Proposition 4. With a backward-looking rule, necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium are
such that
φpi > φpi1 (40)
φpi > φpi2 (41)
and
β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (42)
14 Appendix G demonstrates that the system is obtained by plugging Equation (35) into (A23), (A24) and (A26).
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where
φpi1 =
λpi
λi − γi (43)
φpi2 =
1+ 2 (1+ β) + µyλpi
2µi + µy (λi + γi)
(44)
Proof. See Appendix H.
With our baseline model calibration, the reader can easily check that bounds (43)–(44) are not
binding, if φpi > 0. As a result, the following holds:
Corollary 5. With our model calibration, necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium are
φpi > 0 and (42).
This result emerges because the bounds established in Proposition 4 are negative. Obviously the
determinacy regions depend on the parameter values of the Taylor rule. It should be stressed, though,
that the Taylor principle does not need to hold strictly to generate determinate equilibria.
3.5. Expected Inflation and Current Output
In this section, we focus on the monetary policy rule
i˜t = φpiEtp˜it+1 + φyy˜t (45)
Rule (45) is a representation for the monetary policy strategy of expected inflation targeting
outlined by Svensson (2003). It is based on a pre-emptive response of the monetary authority with
respect to the inflation rate.
Proposition 6. Under rule (45), we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium:
φy <
λiµy
γiµi
(46)
φpi >
β
µi
(47)
φpi >
β (γi − λi)− µiλpi
γiµi
(48)
φy <
φpi
[
µi + µy (λi − γi)
]− (1− β) + µyλpi
(1− β) λi + µiλpi − φpiγiµi (49)
and
β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (50)
Proof. See Appendix I.
Figure 3 plots the numerical regions consistent with the bounds (48)–(49) for determinate
equilibria. These are based on the model calibration discussed earlier. The continuous line refers to
bound (48) for φpi , while the dashed line refers to (49) for φy. We observe that the region for determinacy
is located within an area for high values for φpi and low values for φy. In this case, the conditions
outlined above comply fully with the Taylor principle.
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Figure 3. Determinacy regions for a Taylor rule with expected inflation and current output.
3.6. Interest-Rate Smoothing
Here we consider a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing:
i˜t = φpip˜it + φi i˜t−1 (51)
The results are collected in the following proposition
Proposition 7. Under Rule (51), the following necessary and sufficient conditions hold:
φi <
1
β
(52)
φpi >
1+ βφiµyλpi
β
(
µi + µyγi
) (53)
φpi >
µyλpi (1+ βφi)− 2 (1+ β)− 2βφi (1+ β)
µi (1+ β) + µy (λi + βγi)
(54)
φi <
φpiβ
(
µi + µyγi
)− 1
βµyλpi
(55)
and
β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (56)
Proof. See Appendix J.
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Figure 4 plots the bounds described in Proposition 7 for the baseline calibration of the model. The
horizontal line consists of the bound (52) for φi. Proposition 7 establishes also two bounds for φpi. These
follow from Equations (53) and (54) and are represented, respectively, by the= dash-dotted the dashed lines.
The continuous line corresponds to the bound (55). From Figure 4 we observe that there are determinate
equilibria for values of φpi generally bigger than one (as stated in the current empirical literature), and for
values for φi compatible with (52), when fiscal policy lies within the range defined by (56).
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Figure 4. Determinacy regions for a Taylor rule with current inflation and interest rate smoothing.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the determinacy of equilibria in a cashless environment where
government debt plays an important macroeconomic role. We consider a variant of the standard
New Keynesian framework with two types of government bonds. We introduce a short-term bond
that provides transaction services the purchase of consumption goods, and a long-term bond that
acts as a store of value. We show that, when fiscal policy is designed according to the prescriptions
of fiscal theory of the price level, determinacy is achieved by following the Taylor principle (see
Leeper and Leith 2016). In order to pin down the price level, fiscal policy need not be passive in
the sense of Leeper (1991). These findings confirm with those of Canzoneri and Diba (2005) and
Canzoneri et al. (2008), who use a model with liquidity services from money and bonds to suggest
that the Taylor principle is not a panacea for determinacy.
Our analysis can be extended along a number of relevant directions. First of all, we can drop
the simplifying assumption about exogenous spread between the interest rates of the two types
of bonds. An endogenous spread would introduce an additional element that might strengthen
the macroeconomic role of government bonds and, possibly, alter the conditions for equilibrium
determinacy. The introduction of different forms of distortionary taxation would add new transmission
channel that can change the results greatly.
Vayanos and Vila (2009) has proposed a preferred-habitat theory of term structure of interest rates.
Their work suggests that there is a non-negligible class of investors that have preference motives for
holding government bonds with a desired maturity. But this opens up a specific scope for bonds in
general equilibrium, which is independent from the role of transaction or liquidity services. In future
work, we plan to consider an extended framework of substitutability or complementarity between
consumption and government bonds.
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Appendix A. A Further Discussion on Model Structure and Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, we provide a further discussion on the model structure, the first-order conditions,
and the regularity conditions that characterize the bond-velocity term.
Appendix A.1. Supply Side
Each individual firm faces a downward demand curve of the same sort of (A11), with Yt (j) in
place of Cit and chooses the optimal quantity of labour input Lt (j) by maximizing the following stream
of real profits
Ωt (j) =
∞
∑
t=0
ρtωt (j) =
∞
∑
t=0
ρt
[
Pt (j)
Pt
Yt (j)− WtPt Lt (j)− AC
p
t
]
(A1)
subject to the demand function (A11), to the production function (16) and to the price adjustment cost
function (15). Note that in (A1) ρt is a stochastic pricing kernel for contingent claims employed by
firms to discount future profit stream. Thus, the firm’s first order condition with respect to Lt (j) is
Wt
Pt
= α
(
1− 1
ψt (j)
)(
Yt (j)
Lt (j)
)(
Pt (j)
Pt
)
(A2)
with
1
ψt (j)
=
1
θ
{
1− φp
[
Pt (j)
Pt−1 (j)
− pi
]
Pt
Pt−1 (j)
Yt
Yt (j)
(A3)
+Et
[
φp
ρt+1
ρt
(
Pt+1 (j)
Pt (j)
− pi
)
Pt+1
Pt (j)
Pt+1 (j)
Pt (j)
Yt+1
Yt (j)
]}
The term ψt (j) can be interpreted as the output demand elasticity augmented by cost of price
adjustment weighted by the stochastic pricing kernel ρt. In steady state, if
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
= pi for all t and j,
we get that ψt (j) = θ. The markup for each firm j is defined by
µt (j) =
(
1− 1
ψt (j)
)−1
(A4)
In steady state, the markup is given by θθ−1 , so that when θ → ∞, µ→ 1. With perfectly flexible
prices with φp = 0 the markup is once again θθ−1 . From the expressions in (A3)–(A4) we see that that
markup becomes endogenous and works as a transmission channel for both real and nominal shocks.
An increase in ψt (j) reduces µt (j) and is expansionary, due to the reduction of monopolistic distortion.
Appendix A.2. Demand Side
An important aspect for a full characterization of the equilibrium is represented by the role of
intertemporal discount factor of both firms and consumers. In what follows, we assume that each
agent has access to a set of complete market for contingent claims. The direct implication of this
assumption is that the discount factor of households should equal that of firms, as stated by:
ρt+1
ρt
=
βλt+1
λt
(A5)
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 23 16 of 27
For the intuition behind condition (A5) it is enough to imagine the presence of a representative
agent who can freely exchange shares of each firm, without paying any transaction cost. The same
result can be obtained by including an additional first order condition for the optimal allocation of
shares for the representative agent.
By combining the first-order conditions on consumption and labour (6)–(7) together with (10),
the labour supply curve is given by
(1− γ)
γ
Ct
1− Lt =
Wt
1+ χ2 F
2
t + χFt
(A6)
From Equation (A6) it is not difficult to show that the labour supply function is increasing with
respect to real wage, but decreasing with respect to consumption. After making use of the equation of the
government budget constraint, we find the following expression for the aggregate resource equation
Ct
(
1+
χ
2
F2t
)
= Yt
[
1− φp
2
(pit − pi)2
]
− Gt (A7)
From (A7) we observe that the amount of income available for consumption is obtained net of
resources employed for making transactions and public expenditure. An important feature considered
in the present model derives from the specific functional form assumed for the transaction costs
function (10). In fact, from Euler Equation (9) we find that
(1+ it) β
λt+1
pit
= λt
(
1− χF3t
)
(A8)
where, from (6) λt is defined according to
λt =
C
γ(1− 1σ )−1
t (1− Lt)(1−γ)(1−
1
σ )(
1+ χ2 F
2
t + χFt
)
Pt
(A9)
Therefore, since λt is a monotone decreasing function of Ft, there are at least two positive steady
state satisfying (A8). The first is such that λ = 0, with F = ∞. The second is given by
(1+ i) β
pi
= 1− χF3 (A10)
There might be no solution to Equation (A10). This is the case if (1+ i) β > pi. In what follows,
we assume that (1+ i) β < pi. If this condition is verified, we immediately get that Equation (A8)
becomes a difference equation, with a converging solution.
The standard optimization problem for the choice of the optimal composition of bundle (14) leads
to the following constant-elasticity inverse demand function
cit (j)
Ct
=
[
pt (j)
Pt
]−θ
(A11)
where pt (j) is the price of variety j and Pt is the general price index defined as
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt (j)
1−θ dj
] 1
1−θ
(A12)
As θ → ∞ demand function becomes perfectly elastic, and the differentiated goods are perfect
substitutes. The aggregate price level Pt is beyond the control of each individual firm. When we
aggregate Ct and cit (j) across all agents i, we find the aggregate demand for final goods and for variety
j, given respectively by Yt =
∫ 1
0 Ctdi and Yjt =
∫ 1
0 c
i
t (j) di, for all j ∈ [0, 1].
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Appendix A.3. Some Considerations on the Bond-Velocity Term
In what follows, we aare going to sketch an argument in order to exclude that the ‘bond velocity’
term F grows arbitrarily without bound with positive probability. The discussion and notation is based
on a similar argument proposed by Sims (1994) in a monetary model.
Let F be the unique solution to (A10). If we have an off-equilibrium path value for Ft such that
Ft > F or β < pi, then from Equation (A8) we find that
Et [λt+1] < Φλt (A13)
for a given Φ, such that 0 < Φ < 1. Therefore, given the information available at time t condensed by the
information set It, the probability that λt+1 is lower than λt is positive, given Equation (A13), namely
P [λt+1 < Φλt | It] > 0 (A14)
Applying (A14) recursively, we get
P [λt+s < Φsλt | It] > 0 (A15)
Equation (A14) together with the transaction technology function puts an upper bound on F.
This allows to exclude any path for λt that require F growing with positive probability. To sum up,
if Ft > F for all t, then λt must have a positive probability of growing arbitrarily close to zero as t→ ∞.
However, this would imply a non-zero probability of arbitrarily large values of Ft. Therefore, Ft > F is
impossible on an equilibrium path. By a similar argument, if β > pi, we have a positive probability of
getting an arbitrarily large large value of F, which is inconsistent with an equilibrium positive level of
unstarred debt.
By the same sort of argument, if Ft < F, for some t and β > pi we have that there is a non-zero
probability that λt+s becomes arbitrarily large, so Ft assumes values arbitrarily close to zero, as
t→ ∞. This is once again inconsistent with the equilibrium path, because it violates the transversality
condition. Again, we must conclude that the value for F which solves (A10) is an equilibrium value.
Appendix B. The Log-Linearized Model
The next step consists in reducing the model into a three equations system, an intertemporal
version of the IS equation, an aggregate supply equation (AS, henceforth), and the government budget
constraint. In order to derive the reduced form system, we take a log-linear approximation around
the steady state. In what follows, each variable y˜t is approximated around the steady state by using
the formula X˜t = log y˜t − log X. Via recursive substitution, we arrive at the following log-linearized
version of the resource constraint
C˜t =
Y˜t
Sc (1+ χF2)
− g
Sc (1+ χF2)
G˜t −
2ScχF3bζ
Sc (1+ χF2)
ζ˜t +
2ScχF2bi
Sc (1+ χF2)
i˜t (A16)
where the coefficients bζ and bi, are reported in Appendix C. The next step consists in log-linearizing
the first order conditions (6) and (7), eliminate C˜t from both equation, by making use of (A16). Next,
we can eliminate L˜t from the log-linearized version of the production function to get the following
equation for λ˜t
λ˜t = ηyY˜t − ηgG˜t + ηa A˜t + ηζ ζ˜t + ηi i˜t (A17)
where the analytical expression for the coefficients ηy, ηg, ηa, ηζ , ηi are reported in Appendix C.
After having log-linearized the first order condition on B∗t (Equation (8)), the intertemporal IS
equation (after rearrangement) is
Y˜t+1 − λgG˜t+1 + λa A˜t+1 + λζ ζ˜t+1 + λi i˜t+1 − λpipit+1 = Y˜t − λgG˜t + λa A˜t + γζ ζ˜t + γi i˜t (A18)
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where the coefficients are defined as λg = ηg/ηy, λa = ηa/ηy, λζ = ηζ/ηy, λi = ηi/ηy, γζ =(
ηζ − αi
)
η−1y , λpi = η−1y . Equation (A18) is the intertemporal IS equation, as discussed by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), among others. The new feature expressed in Equation (A18) is given by the
presence of the nominal interest rate dated at time t + 1, i˜t+1, together with the interest rate dated
at time t, i˜t. The presence of i˜t+1 is due to the characteristics of the transaction technologies F and B
considered in the model.
The derivation of the aggregate supply equation starts from the log-linearization of the elasticity
ψt given by
ψ˜t = φppit − βφppit+1 (A19)
To simplify algebra, we assume that the steady state of the inflation rate has been set equal to 1.
From the first order condition with respect to L we have that
W˜t = Y˜t − L˜t + (θ − 1)−1 φppit − (θ − 1)−1 βφppit+1 (A20)
Moreover, from the production function L˜t = α−1
(
Y˜t − A˜t
)
. To get an useful expression of the
AS equation, we can substitute out into the log-linearized version of (7), the Equation (A20) for W˜t,
Equation (A17) for λ˜t, Equation (A16) for C˜t, and L˜t. After rearrangement, we find
βEtpit+1 = pit − µyY˜t + µgG˜t + µζ ζ˜t + µA A˜t + µi i˜t (A21)
where the coefficients µy, µg, µA, µζ , µi are reported in Appendix C.
The model is expressed as a function of the output gap y˜t defined (in log-linear terms) as X˜t =
Y˜t − Y˜pt , where Y˜pt is the level of potential output defined as
Y˜pt =
µg
µy
G˜t +
µζ
µy
ζ˜t +
µA
µy
A˜t (A22)
Therefore, the aggregate supply equation can be written as
βEtpit+1 = pit − µyX˜t + µi i˜t (A23)
By the same sort of argument, we can rewrite also the IS equation by using the definition of the
output gap given by (A22), to get
X˜t+1 + λi i˜t+1 − λpipit+1 = X˜t + γi i˜t + Rnt (A24)
where Rnt indicates a composite term of disturbances defined as follows
Rnt =
[
δg
(
G˜t − G˜t+1
)
+ δa
(
A˜t − A˜t+1
)
+ δζ2ζ˜t − δζ ζ˜t+1
]
(A25)
The term Rnt defined in (A25) indicates the natural rate of interest, namely the real interest rate
consistent with full employment equilibrium and a zero inflation rate. In the definition of Rnt there are
all the stochastic processes of the model. It should be stressed, though, Rnt is an irrelevant term for
the purpose of the determinacy analysis because its magnitude does not affect the dynamic structure
of the model. Differently from the standard AS equation proposed in the literature, Equation (A23)
includes the nominal interest rate i˜t. This is due to the relationship between the level of real debt bt
and the nominal interest rate.
Since we study the issue of price level determination in relation to fiscal solvency, a key equation
of the above system is the government budget constraint. In order to make the system entirely defined
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by four variables (inflation rate, output gap, interest rate and unstarred real debt), we can now derive
the semi-reduced form of the government budget constraint
γyX˜t + b˜∗t + γpipit + γi i˜t =
(
β−1 − ψ1
)
b˜∗t−1 + θi i˜t−1 + θyX˜t−1 + R2t (A26)
where R2t is
R2t =
(
θg + θy
µg
µy
)
G˜t−1 − γgG˜t + θy µaµy A˜t−1 − γy
µa
µy
A˜t +
(
θζ + θy
µζ
µy
)
ζ˜t−1 − γζ ζ˜t (A27)
with the coefficients reported in the following appendix.
Appendix C. Coefficients of the Reduced-Form Model
bζ=
ζi
3χF3 (1+ ζi)
; bi=
i (1− ζ) + ζi2
3χF3 (1+ ζi)2
Coefficients of Equation (A17)
ηy =
γ
(
1− 1σ
)
− 1
Sc (1+ χF2)
−
(1− γ)
(
1− 1σ
)
L
α (1− L) ; ηa =
(1− γ)
(
1− 1σ
)
L
α (1− L) ;
ηζ =
χF (1+ F) bζ
1+ χ2 F
2 + χF
−
[
γ
(
1− 1σ
)
− 1
]
2ScχF2bζ
Sc (1+ χF2)
;
ηg =
[
γ
(
1− 1σ
)
− 1
]
g
Sc (1+ χF2)
; ηi =
[
γ
(
1− 1σ
)
− 1
]
2ScχF2bi
Sc (1+ χF2)
− χF (1+ F)
1+ χ2 F
2 + χF
Coefficients of Equation (A21):
µy =
(θ − 1)
φp
 γ
(
1− 1σ
)
Sc (1+ χF2)
−
[
(1− γ)
(
1− 1σ
)
− 1
]
L
(1 − L) − 1
α
− ηy − 1

µg =
(θ − 1)
φp
 γ
(
1− 1σ
)
g
Sc (1+ χF2)
− ηg

µi =
(θ − 1)
φp
[
ηi − 2ScχF
2biγ
Sc (1+ χF2)
(
1− 1
σ
)]
µζ =
(θ − 1)
φp
[
ης +
2ScχF2bζγ
Sc (1+ χF2)
(
1− 1
σ
)]
µA =
(θ − 1)
φp
ηA −
[
(1− γ)
(
1− 1σ
)
− 1
]
L
(1 − L) − 1
α

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The coefficients of Equation (A26) are defined as:
γy =
b
b∗
1
Sc (1+ χF2)
; γζ =
b
b∗
2χF3bζ
(1+ χF2)
αi =
2χF2bi
(1+ χF2)
;
γi =
b
b∗ αi; γg =
1
b∗
(
b
g
Sc (1+ χF2)
+ G
)
θi = i∗ +
ib
b∗ + (1+ i)
bαi
b∗ +
b
b∗
2χF2biψ2
(1+ χF2)
+
ψ2bbi
b∗
γpi = i∗ +
ib
b∗ − ψ1 − ψ2
b
b∗
θζ = i∗ − (1+ i) bb∗
[
2χF3bζ
(1+ χF2)
]
+
2bχF3bζψ2
b∗ (1+ χF2)
− ψ2bbζ
b∗
θy =
b (1+ i− ψ2)
b∗Sc (1+ χF2)
; θg =
b [ψ2 − (1+ i) g]
b∗Sc (1+ χF2)
Appendix D. Schur-Cohn Criterion
Appendix D.1. 2× 2 Matrix
The characteristic equation of a 2× 2 matrix A is given by x2 − tr(A)x + det(A) = 0 . It is well
known that the condition for two roots of the characteristic equation to lie outside the unit circle is (see
LaSalle 1986):
|det(A)| > 1, (A28)
|tr(A)| < 1+ det(A). (A29)
In particular, condition (A29) can be split up in the following two inequalities:
1+ det(A) + tr(A) > 0 (A30)
1+ det(A)− tr(A) > 0 (A31)
Appendix D.2. 3× 3 Matrix
In what follows, to facilitate the task of the reader, we present the entire set of conditions to be
satisfied by a generic 3× 3 matrix B in order to have one root inside the unit circle and two roots
outside the unit circle. Given the following characteristic polynomial of a 3× 3 matrix:
℘ (λ) = λ3 + A2λ2 + A1λ+ A0 (A32)
where: A0 = −det (B) ; A1 = −tr (B) ; A2 = Ω (B) = (b11b22 − b21b12) + (b22b33 − b32b23) +
(b11b33 − b31b13) . Therefore, necessary and sufficient conditions are given by the following restrictions
on the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial (A32). Either:
CASE I
1+ A2 + A1 + A0 < 0 (A33)
−1+ A2 − A1 + A0 > 0 (A34)
or:
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CASE II
1+ A2 + A1 + A0 > 0 (A35)
−1+ A2 − A1 + A0 < 0 (A36)
A20 − A0 A2 + A1 − 1 > 0 (A37)
or:
CASE III
1+ A2 + A1 + A0 > 0 (A38)
−1+ A2 − A1 + A0 < 0 (A39)
A20 − A0 A2 + A1 − 1 < 0 (A40)
|A2| > 3 (A41)
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 1
The trace and the determinant of submatrix ∆ defined in (32) are:
det (∆) =
1
β
+
(
µi + µyγi
)
φpi
β
tr (∆) = 1+
1
β
+
(
µi + µyγi
)
φpi
β
− µyλpi
β
From condition (A28) of the Schur-Cohn criterion, it is certainly true that det (∆) > −1.
The condition det (∆) > 1 implies:
φpi > − (1− β)
µi + µyγi
(A42)
On the other hand, condition (A30) directly implies:
φpi >
µyλpi − 2 (1+ β)[
2µi + µy (γi + λi)
] (A43)
while (A31) implies:
φpi (1+ γi − λi) > 0 (A44)
which is always satisfied, since we set φpi > 0 , by hypothesis. By using the benchmark parameter
values considered in the model, it is immediate to verify that the bound established by (A43) is
bigger than that specified by (A42), under a wide range of the core parameter values. Therefore,
condition (A43) is both necessary and sufficient to ensure determinacy.
For the system condensed in matrix Γ we require that the third root be inside the unit circle. This
is true if ∣∣∣β−1 − ψ1∣∣∣ < 1, (A45)
which means that fiscal policy is passive according to Leeper (1991). This condition is equivalent to:
β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 (A46)
When both conditions (A43) and (A46) are satisfied, then all the three roots of the system are
inside the unit circle, and the equilibrium will be unique. 
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Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 2
Once again, given the triangular structure of matrix we can concentrate on the eigenvalues of the
submatrix Γ2×211 and that of Γ
1×1
22 , in (24)–(25).
The trace and the determinant of submatrix Γ2×211 are given, respectively, by:
tr (Γ11) =
(1+ µiφpi)
(
1+ λiφy
)
+ (λpi − λiφpi)
(
µiφy − µy
)
+ β
(
1+ γiφy
)
β
(
1+ λiφy
)
det (Γ11) =
µiφpi + 1+ γiφy − µy
β
(
1+ λiφy
)
The condition det (∆) > 1 implies:
φpi >
µy − (1− β)− (γi − βλi) φy
µi
(A47)
On the other hand, from condition (A30) we get:
φpi >
µy (1+ λpi)− 2 (1+ β)− φy (λi + λpiµi + γi (1+ β))
2µi + λiµy
(A48)
Finally, from (A31) we find the following bound:
φy >
φpiλiµi + β− 1+ µy (1− λpi)
γi − λi − λpiµi − βγi (A49)
According to benchmark parameter values in the calibration section, we immediately get that the
bounds which are only binding are (A48) and (A49). In fact, bound given by (A47) is negative, given
our parameter values so it is not binding by setting φpi > 0.
Condition (A48)–(A49) imply that two eigenvalues of matrix Γ are outside the unit circle: this is
enough to establish the equilibrium determinacy induced by rule (21). Thus, the third root given by the
determinant of Γ1×122 should lie inside the unit circle. This is equivalent to require that condition (A45)
be verified, or that β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1, which directly originates condition (26).
If one of the two bounds given in (A48)–(A49) is not respected—for example, the lower bound
given by (A48)—then the submatrix Γ11 will have one root inside and one outside the unit circle.
To restore determinacy we need another root outside the unit circle: this can be reach by setting∣∣β−1 − ψ1∣∣ > 1 , or ψ1 < β−1 − 1;ψ1 > β−1 + 1. 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 3
Therefore, to study determinacy we can focus on the 2× 2 submatrix ∆2×2 given by
∆ =
[
b11 −µyb11
− a21b11a22
µyb11a21+1
a22
]
(A50)
The determinant and trace of matrix ∆ are given, respectively, by:
det (∆) =
1
β− φpi
(
µi + λiµy
)
trace (∆) =
1− µyλpi + β− µiφpi − µyγiφpi
β− φpi
(
µi + λiµy
)
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To study determinacy, we require conditions (A28)–(A29) to be satisfied. From (A28) we find that
det (∆) > 1 can be satisfied if:
φpi > − (1− β)
µi + λiµy
= φpi1 (A51)
while condition det (∆) < −1 implies:
φpi >
(1+ β)
µi + λiµy
(A52)
Condition (A52) is satisfied by setting φpi > 0 . The second set of condition (A29) can be split into
(A30)–(A31). From (A30) we get:
φpi <
2 (1+ β)− λpiµy
2µi + µy (λi + γi)
= φpi2 (A53)
while from (A31) we have that:
φpi > − λpi
γi − λi = φpi3 (A54)
To get determinacy (one root inside and one root outside the unit circle), we require:
φpi1 < φpi < φpi2 (A55)
Condition (A55) implies that two roots of submatrix (A50) are outside the unit circle. On the other
hand, the third root of the whole matrix (36) has to be outside the unit circle: this is obtained by fixing
parameter ψ1 within the range β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1. If (A55) is not satisfied, this means that only
one root of the submatrix (A50) is outside the unit circle. To fulfill the requirement that two roots of (36)
have to stay outside the unit circle we must require that
∣∣β−1 − ψ1∣∣ > 1. 
Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 4
The system can be cast in the same format as in (23), where vector Zt is now given by Zt =[
i˜t, p˜it, y˜t, b˜∗t
]′ , matrix Γ is:
Γ =

0
∆3×3 0
0
c41 c42 c43 β−1 − ψ1
 (A56)
where submatrix ∆3×3 is:
∆3×3 =
 0 φpi 0µiβ 1β − µyβ
λpiµi
β + γi
λpi
β − λiφpi 1−
λpiµy
β
 (A57)
det (∆) = − φpiβ
(
µyγi + µi
)
; tr (∆) = 1 + 1β −
µyλpi
β ; Ω =
1−φpiλiµy−µiφpi
β . To study determinacy, we
require that matrix (A56) to have two roots outside and two roots inside the unit circle. Given the
block-triangular structure of the model, we require submatrix (A57) to have two roots inside and one
root outside the circle. To verify this, we can apply conditions (A33)–(A34). Condition (A33) implies:
φpi >
λpi
λi − γi = φpi1 (A58)
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From condition (A34), we find (after proper rearrangments):
φpi >
1+ 2 (1+ β) + µyλpi
2µi + µy (λi + γi)
= φpi2 (A59)
On the other hand, the fourth root of the whole matrix (36) has to be outside the unit circle: this is
obtained by fixing parameter ψ1 within the range β−1 − 1 < ψ1 < β−1 + 1 . If (A58) or (A59) are not
satisfied, then only one root of the submatrix (A50) is outside the unit circle. To fulfill the requirement
that two roots of (36) have to stay outside the unit circle we must require that
∣∣β−1 − ψ1∣∣ > 1.
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 6
By using the rule (45) in (A23), (A24), (A26) and rearranging, we find that the system can be cast
in the same format as in (23), with vector Zt given by Zt = [pit, y˜t, b∗t ]
′ , and matrix Γ is
Γ =
 a1 −a2 0−a1b2b−11 b−11 (a2b2 + b3) 0
c31a1 −a2c31 + b3c32 + d3
(
β−1 − ψ1
)
 (A60)
where a1 = (β− µiφpi)−1; a2 =
(
µy − µiφy
)
(β− µiφpi)−1;
b1 = 1+ λiφy − λiφpi
(
µy − µiφy
)
(β− µiφpi)−1 ;
b2 = λiφpi (β− µiφpi)−1 − λpi − γiφpi ; b3 = 1+ γiφy;
d1 = γy − θiφpi
(
µy − µiφy
)
(β− µiφpi)−1 + γiφy ; d2 = γpi + γiφpi (β− µiφpi)−1 − θiφpi ;
d3 = θiφy + θy ; c31 = b2d1b−11 − d2 ; c32 = −d1b−11
Given the block triangularity structure of matrix (A60), we can concentrate on the submatrix ∆
∆ =
[
a1 −a2
−a1b2b−11 b−11 (a2b2 + b3)
]
(A61)
The system considered in matrix (A60) has a determinate solution if and only if two roots are
outside and one inside the unit circle. By applying (A28) to matrix (A61), we find that condition
det (∆) > 1 , implies:
βφy (γi − λi) + φpi
(
λiµy − γiµiφy
)
> 0
which is verified if and only if:
φy <
λiµy
γiµi
since φpi > 0 by hypothesis and γi > λi , by construction. Condition det (∆) < −1 implies (after
rearrangements):
φpi >
β
µi
(A62)
Furthermore, condition (A30) implies:
φpiφyµi [β (γi − λi)− µi (λpi + φpiγi)] + (A63)
(β− µiφpi)
{
λiφy [1+ β (1+ β)]− µyλpi + 1+ β− φpi
[
µy (γi + λi) + µi
]}
> 0
Since µi < 0 (from parameters value) and (A62), to satisfy (A63) we require that
ccβ (γi − λi)− µi (λpi + φpiγi) < 0 (A64)
λiφy [1+ β (1+ β)]− µyλpi + 1+ β− φpi
[
µy (γi + λi) + µi
]
< 0 (A65)
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From (A64), we find:
φpi >
β (γi − λi)− µiλpi
γiµi
(A66)
from (A65), we have, instead:
φpi >
λiφy [1+ β (1+ β)]− µyλpi + 1+ β
µy (γi + λi) + µi
(A67)
From condition (A31), we have that:
φpi
[
µi
(
1+ φyγi
)
+ µy (γi − λi)
]
> 1− β− µyλpi + φy [(1− β) λi + µiλpi ]
which gives the following bound:
φy <
φpi
[
µi
(
1+ φyγi
)
+ µy (γi − λi)
]− (1− β) + µyλpi
(1− β) λi + µiλpi (A68)
as stated. The condition relative to the fiscal side of the model are still the same as those considered in
the previous propositions.
Appendix J. Proof of Proposition 7
The system can be cast in the same format as in (23), where vector Zt is now Zt =
[
i˜t, p˜it, y˜t, b˜∗t
]′ ,
matrix Γ is:
Γ =

0
∆3×3 0
0
h41 h42 h43 β−1 − ψ1
 (A69)
where:
∆3×3 =

φi +
µiφpi
β
φpi
β −
µyφpi
β
µi
β
1
β −
µy
β
−λiφi + µi(λpi−φpiλi)β λpi−φpiλiβ 1−
µy(λpi−φpiλi)
β
 (A70)
with:
h41 = d41φi + d42µi + γyγi + θi ; h42 = d42 ;
h43 = −µyd42 + γy + θy ; d42 = γi φpiβ + γpiβ +
γy
β (λpi − φpiλi) .
To obtain determinacy, we need to have two roots inside the unit circle and two roots outside.
Let us concentrate on the characteristics of matrix (A70). In order to find conditions that ensure
matrix (A70) to have one root inside and one outside unit circle, we need to study which of the three
cases apply to polynomial. In this case, we have that:
A2 = −tr(∆) = βφi + µiφpi + 1+ β− µy (λpi − φpiλi)
A1 = βφi (1+ β) + β− βφiµyλpi + µiφpiβ+ µyφpiβγi
A0 = −β2φi
According to (A33) from Case I, we get:
µiφpi (β− 1) + µyλpi (1− βφi) + µyφpi (βγi − λi) < 0 (A71)
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From current parameter values, it is not difficult to check that condition (A71) is not satisfied.
Therefore, we apply conditions (A35)–(A37) from Case II. Condition (A71) is satisfied with reversed
sign if and only if:
1
β
> φi (A72)
From (A36) we have:
φpi >
µyλpi (1+ βφi)− 2 (1+ β)− 2βφi (1+ β)
µi (1+ β) + µy (λi + βγi)
(A73)
Consider now condition (A37) to get the following bound:
β2φi
(
1+ β2
)
+ β (1+ φi) + β2φi
[
βφi + µiφpi + 1+ β− µy (λpi − φpiλi)
]
+ (A74)
+µiφpiβ− βφiµyλpi + βφpiµyγi − 1 > 0
We observe that β2φi
(
1+ β2
)
+ β (1+ φi) is positive by definition. The expression in squared
brackets of (A74) is positive if and only if:
φpi >
µyλpi − 1− β (1+ φi)
µi + µyλi
(A75)
The last part of Equation (A74) is positive if and only if
φi <
φpiβ
(
µi + µyγi
)− 1
βµyλpi
(A76)
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